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Abstract
Quitting games are n-player sequential games in which, at any
stage, each player has the choice between continuing and quitting.
The game ends as soon as at least one player chooses to quit; player i
then receives a payoﬀ ri
S, which depends on the set S of players that
did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payoﬀ to each player
is zero.
In this note, we study a four-player game, where the simplest equi-
librium proﬁle is cyclic with period two.
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11 Introduction
Quitting games are I-player sequential games in which, at any stage, each
player has the choice between continuing and quitting. The game ends as
soon as at least one player chooses to quit; player i then receives a payoﬀ ri
S,
which depends on the set S of players that did choose to quit. If the game
never ends, the payoﬀ to each player is 0.
In such a game, a strategy of player i is a sequence xi = (xi
n)n≥0, where
xi
n is the probability that player i continues at stage n, provided the game
has not terminated before. Such a strategy is stationary if xi
n is independent
of i. We denote by ai
n the action played by player i in stage n, and denote
by t = inf {n ≥ 1,ai
n = qi} the stage in which the game terminates. Given a









where Ex stands for the expectation with respect to the probability distri-
bution induced by x over the set of plays.
It is not known whether quitting games have an equilibrium payoﬀ. Quit-
ting games therefore form an intriguing class of stochastic games. We recall
brieﬂy existing results before presenting the contribution of this note.
In the case of two players, stationary ε-equilibria do exist. A three-
player example was devised by Flesch, Thuijsman and Vrieze (1997), where
ε-equilibrium strategies are more complex - they have a cyclic structure,
and the length of the cycle is at least 3. However, in this example, there
are equilibrium payoﬀs in the convex hull of the vectors r{i} ∈ RI, i ∈ I.
These payoﬀs can be obtained using a proﬁle x that plays in any stage a
perturbation of (c
i)i∈I. Therefore, it left open the possibility of ﬁnding ε-
equilibrium proﬁles, by means of analyzing the limit behavior of stationary
equilibria of discounted games, letting the discount factor go to zero. Indeed,
such an analysis was provided by Solan (1999), for the more general class of
three-player games with absorbing states.
The purpose of this note is to provide a four-player example, where all
the ε-equilibrium payoﬀs involve some kind of cyclic behavior, in which the
probability of quitting in any stage is bounded away from zero. The main
consequence is that all the known tools for proving the existence of equilib-
rium payoﬀs in stochastic games (see, e.g., Tuijsman and Vrieze (1986), Solan
(1999, 2000), Vieille (2000a,2000b)) seem likely to fail to yield any result in
general I-player quitting games. In a companion paper (Solan and Vieille
(2000)), we introduce new tools and provide suﬃcient conditions under which
quitting games have an equilibrium payoﬀs.
22 The Example
























In this game player 1 chooses a row (top row = continue), player 2 chooses
a column (left column = continue), player 3 chooses either the top two ma-
trices or the bottom two matrices, (top two matrices = continue) and player
4 chooses either the left two matrices or the right two matrices (left two
matrices = continue).
Note that there are the following symmetries in the payoﬀ function: for










where vi(a,b,c,d) is the payoﬀ to i if the action combination is (a,b,c,d)
(vi(c1,c2,c3,c4) = 0).
In section 2.1 we prove that this game admits an equilibrium proﬁle y





where x,z ∈]0,1[ are independent of n; that is, at odd stages players 2 and 4
continue, while 1 and 3 quit with positive probability, whereas at even stages
1 and 3 continue, while 2 and 4 quit with positive probability.
Thus, the game admits a cyclic equilibrium with period 2.
We then prove the following:
Proposition 1 The game does not admit a stationary 0-equilibrium.
3Proposition 2 For ε small enough, the game does not admit an ε-equilibrium
x such that ||xn − c|| < ε for every n.
It follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that the game does not admit a
stationary ε-equilibrium, provided ε is small enough. Indeed, let us argue
by contradiction, and assume that for every ε there exists a stationary ε-
equilibrium xε. Let x? be an accumulation point of {xε} as ε → 0. If x? is
terminating (x∗ 6= c) then it is a stationary 0-equilibrium, which is ruled out
by Proposition 1. Otherwise, x? = c, and then, for ε suﬃciently small, there
is an ε-equilibrium x where k xn −c k< ε, which is ruled out by Proposition
2.
Proposition 1 is proved in section 2.2, while Proposition 2 is proved in
section 2.3.
2.1 Cyclic equilibrium
We prove that the game possesses a cyclic equilibrium, where the length of
the cycle is 2. At odd stages players 2 and 4 play c2 and c4 respectively, and
players 1 and 3 continue with probability x and z respectively, both strictly
less than 1. At even stages players 1 and 3 play c1 and c3 respectively, and
players 2 and 4 continue with probability x and z respectively.





where x,z ∈]0,1[ are independent of n.












Figure 3: The game of players 1 and 3 at odd stages
In this game player 1 is the row player, player 3 is the column player, and γi
c
is the continuation payoﬀ of player i = 1,3. The payoﬀs received by players 2
and 4 if termination occurs in an odd stage are given by the matrix below, in
which the ﬁrst coordinate of each entry is player 2’s payoﬀ, and the second
















Figure 4: The game of players 2 and 4 at even stages
where player 2 is the row player, player 4 is the column player, and the
payoﬀs that are received by players 1 and 3 if termination occurs are given
by matrix (1). The two situations are identical (up to the continuation pay-
oﬀs).
We now ﬁnd necessary conditions on (x,z). First, (x,z) is a fully mixed
equilibrium of the matrix game in Figure (3), so that
xγ
3
c = 1 and zγ
1
c = 1,
and both players 1 and 3 receive 1 in this equilibrium.
By the symmetry of the proﬁle, the continuation payoﬀs (resp. initial
payoﬀs) of players 2 and 4 must coincide with the initial payoﬀs (resp. con-
tinuation payoﬀs) of players 1 and 3. That is, (γ1
c,γ3
c) is the payoﬀ received
in the matrix game (1), when the empty entry is ﬁlled with (1,1) and the
row and column players play according to x and z respectively, so that

γ1
c = xz + 4z(1 − x) + (1 − x)(1 − z)
γ3
c = xz + 4z(1 − x)
Set g = γ1
c and h = γ3
c. Since x = 1
h and z = 1
g, one gets

g2h = 1 + 4(g − 1) + (g − 1)(h − 1)
gh2 = 1 + 4(g − 1)




h root of (h − 1)(h4 + 3h3 − 2h2 − 9h + 4) = 0
(2)
Conversely, let (g,h) be a solution to (2) with g,h > 1, and deﬁne a cyclic
proﬁle by x = 1
h, z = 1
g. Given the above properties, in order to prove that it
5is an equilibrium, we need only prove that neither player 2 nor 4 can ﬁnd it
proﬁtable to quit in the ﬁrst stage. This is clear, since players 2 and 4 would
receive at most 1 by quitting, whereas they get strictly more than 1 under
the cyclic proﬁle.
Thus, the existence of such a cyclic equilibrium is equivalent to the ex-
istence of a solution (g,h) to system (2) with g,h > 1. If 1 < h < 2 then





2 − 9X + 4.
Such a root exists since Q(1) < 0 < Q(2).
2.2 No Stationary Equilibria
We check that there is no stationary equilibrium. We do it according to the
number of players who play both actions with positive probability.
It is immediate to check that there is no stationary equilibrium in which
at least three players play pure strategies.
We shall now verify that there is no stationary equilibrium where two
players play pure stationary strategies. Indeed, assume that players 3 and
4 play pure stationary strategies. If such a case arises, players 1 and 2 are
playing a 2 × 2 game. We will see that all the equilibria in these games are
pure, and therefore they cannot generate an equilibrium in the four-player
game.
Case 1: Players 3 and 4 play (q3,q4)
The unique equilibrium is (c1,c2,q3,q4).
Case 2: Players 3 and 4 play (c3,q4)
The unique equilibrium is (c1,q2,c3,q4).
Case 3: Players 3 and 4 play (q3,c4)— symmetric to case 2.
Case 4: Players 3 and 4 play (c3,c4)
There are two equilibria: (q1,c2,c3,c4) and (c1,q2,c3,c4).
We shall now see that there is no stationary equilibrium where players 2
and 4 play pure actions.
Case 1: Players 2 and 4 play (c2,c4)
The unique equilibrium is (q1,c2,q3,c4).
Case 2: Players 2 and 4 play (q2,c4)




4q3,c4). In this equilibrium
player 2 receives 5
8, but if he plays c2 he gets 1.
Case 3: Players 2 and 4 play (c2,q4)
The unique equilibrium is (q1,c2,c3,q4).
Case 4: Players 2 and 4 play (q2,q4)
6The unique equilibrium is (c1,q2,q3,q4).
All the other cases are symmetric to these 8 cases.
Next, we check that there is no stationary equilibrium where one player,
say player 4, plays a pure strategy, and all the other players play a fully mixed
strategy. We denote by (x,y,z) the fully mixed stationary equilibrium in the
three-player game when player 4 plays some pure stationary strategy.
Assume ﬁrst that player 4 plays q4. Then, in order to have player 2
indiﬀerent, we should have
x(1 − z) = z − (1 − x)(1 − z)
which implies that z = 1/2. In order to have player 1 indiﬀerent, we should
have
(1 − y)z + y(1 − z) = yz − (1 − y)(1 − z)
which solves to yz = 1/2, and therefore y = 1, which is pure.
Assume now that player 4 plays c4. First we note that x < 1/2, otherwise
player 3 prefers to play q3 over c3. Next, if player 2 is indiﬀerent between his
actions, then
(1 − x)(1 + 3z)
1 − xz
= x + (1 − x)z
or equivalently,
(1 − x)(1 + 2z + xz
2) = (1 − xz)x.
Since x < 1/2, it follows that 1 − x > x. Therefore it follows that
1 + 2z + xz
2 < 1 − xz
or equivalently 2 + xz < −x, which is clearly false.
2.2.1 No fully mixed stationary equilibrium
We prove now by contradiction that there is no fully mixed stationary equi-
librium. Let (x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗) be such an equilibrium, where 0 < x∗ < 1 is the
probability player 1 puts on c1. Set (a∗,b∗,c∗,d∗) = γ(x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗). Notice
that 0 < a∗,b∗,c∗,d∗ < 1.
Let 0 < y,z,t < 1. Assume that a ∈]0,1[ is the payoﬀ of player 1 if
quitting does not occur at the ﬁrst stage. Then, by playing c1 at stage 1,
player 1 gets
α(a;y,z,t) = yzt(a − 2) − 2yz + 3zt − yt + y + z,
whereas by playing q1 he gets
β(y,z,t) = t + (1 − t)(y + z − 1).











∆1(y,z,t) = α(β(y,z,t);y,z,t) − β(y,z,t)
vanishes at (y∗,z∗,t∗). For simplicity, we write
∆1(y,z,t) = (a − 2)yzt − 2yz + 4zt + 1 − 2t,
with the understanding that a stands for β(y,z,t). ∆2(x,z,t),∆3(x,y,t) and
∆4(x,y,z) are deﬁned in a symmetric way.
Observe that the four polynomials ∆1,∆2,∆3,∆4 should vanish at (x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗).
The proof goes as follows. First we prove that (x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗) is not on the
diagonal of the unit four-dimensional square. We then deﬁne D = {y ≤ z ≤
t} and prove that ∆1 does not vanish on D ∩ {z ≥ 1
2} whereas ∆4 does not
vanish on D ∩ {z ≤ 1
2}.
Lemma 3 (x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗) is not on the diagonal of [0,1]4; that is, it cannot
be the case that x∗ = y∗ = z∗ = t∗.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that (x,x,x,x) is a stationary equilib-
rium, where 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. Note that x = 1 (everyone continues) and x = 0
(everyone quits) do not correspond to an equilibrium. Thus, all players play
a fully mixed action at every stage.
In an equilibrium player 1 is indiﬀerent between continuing and quitting,
hence we should have
4x2(1 − x) + 2x(1 − x)2
(1 − x)3 = x + x
2(1 − x) − (1 − x)
3.
Simplifying both sides yields
2x + 2x2
1 − 2x + x2 = −1 + 4x − 2x
2.
Multiplying both sides by 1 − 2x + x2 and rearranging the arguments yields
0 = 1 − 4x + 13x
2 − 8x
3 + 2x




But the polynomial on the right is positive on ]0,1[.
Without loss of generality, we assume y∗ = min(x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗). We now
point out several facts that will be used extensively:
81. ∂a
∂t(y,z,t) = 2 − y − z > 0; ∂a
∂y(y,z,t) = ∂a
∂z(y,z,t) = 1 − t > 0;
2.
∂∆1
∂y (y,z,t) = (a − 2)zt + yzt(1 − t) − 2z < 0;
3.
∂∆1
∂z (y,z,t) = (a−2)yt+yzt(1−t)−2y+4t is decreasing in y: therefore,




∂z (t,z,t) = (a−2)t2 +t2z(1−t)+
2t > 0.
Thus, on the region y ≤ t ≤ z,
∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(t,t,t) > 0.
Therefore, (x∗,y∗,z∗,t∗) belongs to the region D = {y ≤ z ≤ t}.
Lemma 4 The polynomial ∆1 does not vanish on {y ≤ z ≤ t} ∩ {z ≥ 1
2}.





















Thus, y∗ ≥ 1
2.
Claim: t∗ ≥ 2
3.
We study ∆1 on the domain D1 = {1
2 ≤ y ≤ z ≤ t ≤ 2
3}. Notice ﬁrst that
a is maximized at (2
3, 2
3, 2
3), where it equals 7
9 < 5
6.
On D1, ∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(z,z,t) = f(z,t) = (a−2)z2t−2z2+4zt+1−2t.
One has
∂f

























The latter quantity is maximized at z = 1
2. It is then equal to 2
3(a − 1) + 1
9.
Since a < 5
6, this is negative.
Thus,
∂f
∂z < 0 on D1. Therefore,
∆1(z,z,t) ≥ ∆1(t,t,t) > 0.
The claim is established.
9Claim: One has z∗ < 2
3.
We shall prove that ∆1 > 0 on D2 = {1
2 ≤ y, 2
3 ≤ z ≤ t}. Notice ﬁrst
that a ≥ 2
3 on D2.
Set ﬁrst D3 = D2 ∩ {y < 2
3}. On D3, ∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(2
3, 2





























Set now D4 = D2 ∩ {y ≥ 2
3}. On D4, one has
∂∆1
∂t
= (a − 2)yz + yzt(2 − y − z) + 4z − 2 ≥ (a − 2)yz + 4z − 2.
The function (a−2)yz +4z −2 is increasing in z. Therefore, it is minimized
on the diagonal {y = z}, where it is at least −5
4y2 +4y −2: this minorant is
minimized at y = 2
3; it is then equal to 1
9. Therefore, ∆1 is increasing in t,
and
∆1(y,z,t) ≥ ∆1(z,z,z) > 0.











On D5, a ≥ 2
3, thus
















































Now, each z ∈ [1
2, 2
3] satisﬁes |z− 1
2| ≤ 1
12, or |z− 2
3| ≤ 1
12. Therefore, we need
only prove that |∂h
∂z(z,t)| ≤ 12






zt − 4z + 4t




27, and maximal at (1
2,1), where it equals 2
3.
Lemma 5 The polynomial ∆4 does not vanish on {y ≤ z ≤ t} ∩ {z ≤ 1
2}.
10Proof. We argue by contradiction and denote by (x∗,y∗,z∗) a root of











∗ + 1 − 2y
∗.
Hence, the polynomial P(x,y,z) = xyz + xz − 2xy + y − 1
2 is positive at
(x∗,y∗,z∗).
We prove now that P is negative on D6 =
 
[0,1] × [0, 1





1. on D6 ∩ {x ≤ 1
2}, ∂P
∂y (x,y,z) = xz − 2x + 1 ≥ 0; thus, P is maximized
at y = 1
2; it is then equal to xz
2 + xz − x = x(3
2z − 1) < 0;
2. on D6 ∩ {x ≥ 1
2}, ∂P
∂z (x,y,z) = xy + x > 0; thus, P is maximized at
z = 1
2 and equals















2y < 0; thus, Q is maximized at x = 1,
and then equals y − 3
2y < 0;
(b) on {y ≥ 1
3},
∂Q




4(y − 1) < 0.
2.3 Proof of Proposition 2
In this section we prove that there is no ε-equilibrium proﬁle x such that
k xn − c k< ε for every n ∈ N, provided ε is suﬃciently small.
We ﬁrst introduce a few notations. Given a proﬁle x, and a stage n∈ N,
we denote by xn = (xn,xn+1,...) the proﬁle induced by x in the subgame
starting from stage n. We let c denote the proﬁle of actions (ci), and by ci
the pure stationary strategy that plays repeatedly ci.
Observe ﬁrst that, x being an ε-equilibrium,
Px(t < +∞) ≥ 1 − 2ε. (3)
11(Otherwise, any player i would beneﬁt by playing according to xi for many
stages, before switching to qi). Since ||xn − c|| < ε for every n,
Px(t < +∞,|St| > 1) < 5ε. (4)
It follows that Px(t < +∞,|St| = 1) ≥ 1 − 7ε, hence
P
i∈N γi(x) ≥
5(1 − 7ε) − 4 × 5ε = 5 − 55ε. In particular, there exists a player i such that
γi(x) ≥ 5
4 − 55
4 ε ≥ 5
4 − 16ε.
Deﬁne ri = Px(St = {i}).











− 4ε ∀i ∈ N. (5)
Indeed, γi(x) ≥ 1 − (ρ + 1)ε ≥ 1 − 2ρε for each i ∈ N (otherwise,
player i can quit at stage 1 and get at least 1−ρε.) By (4) we get r1+4r2 ≥
γ1(x)−5ρε ≥ 1−7ρε, and similarly 4r1+r2 ≥ 1−7ρε. Thus, r1+r2 ≥ 2
5−14
5 ρε.
In a similar way one gets r1+r2 ≤ 1−r3−r4 ≤ 3
5+ 14
5 ρε. The set of solutions
(r1,r2) of these equations is a triangle in the positive quadrant, and one may
check that (5) holds for any such solution.
The rest of the proof goes as follows. In an equilibrium, as long as the
continuation payoﬀ of some player is more than 1, he does not quit (since by
quitting he gets at most 1). In an ε-equilibrium this is no longer true, since
a player may quit with small probability even when quitting yields him low
payoﬀ. We ﬁrst prove that as long as the continuation payoﬀ of some player
is more than 1 +
√
ε, the overall probability he quits cannot exceed O(
√
ε).
Assume w.l.o.g. that γ1(x) ≥ 5/4 − 16ε, then, since q1 ≥ 2/15 − 4ε
it follows that for some n1, γ1(xn) < 1 +
√
ε. Moreover, if n1 is the ﬁrst
such stage, then player 1 quits with negligible probability until stage n1.
Since the continuation payoﬀ of 1 decreases only when 2 quits, it follows that
player 2 quits with a non-negligible probability before stage n1. Since the
probability that 1 quits before stage 1 is negligible, it must be the case that
the probability that 3 and 4 quit before stage n1 is also negligible. Indeed,
otherwise the continuation payoﬀ of 2 would increase, and, as for 1, once his
continuation payoﬀ is more than 1+
√
ε, he would stop quitting. Thus, until
stage n1 only player 2 quits with a non-negligible probability. But that means
that at stage n1, the continuation payoﬀ of 3 and 4 is high. However, as long
as their continuation payoﬀ is high, they do not quit, and the only way the
continuation payoﬀ of player 3 (resp. 4) can decrease is that player 4 (resp.
3) quit with non-negligible probability. That makes such an ε-equilibrium
impossible.
We now formalize these ideas.
12For every strategy xi of player i and every n ≥ 0 let ˜ xi(n) be the strategy
which plays ci up to stage n, and coincides with xi after stage n, and let
pi
n = pi
n(x) = Px(t < n,i ∈ St) be the probability that player i quits up to
stage n, and let pi
∞ = limn→∞ pi
n. Note that 2/15 − 5ε ≤ ri ≤ pi
∞ ≤ ri + ε.
Lemma 6 Let x be a proﬁle that satisﬁes (i) k xn−c k< ε and (ii) γi(xn) ≥
1 +
√









n − (2N + 3)ρε.
Proof. Fix a player i ∈ N. We ﬁrst assume that in x only one player
quits at every stage; that is, for every n ∈ N, xj
n 6= 1 for at most one player










Assume n = 1. If i continues at stage 0, then ˜ xi(1) = xi and pi
1 = 0, and






























where the last inequality holds by condition (ii).
Assume now that 1 < n ≤ n0. If i continues at stage n then ˜ xi(n) =
˜ xi(n − 1) and pi
n = pi




























































Thus, (6) holds for every n ≤ n0.
13Let now x be an arbitrary proﬁle that satisﬁes (i) and (ii). We are now
going to deﬁne a new proﬁle y that approximates x, and satisﬁes that at every
stage at most one player quits with positive probability. We then apply (6)
to y to get the desired estimate for x.
For each i and n, deﬁne αi

















n) i > 1
Since αi
n < ε for every i, βi
n < Kε for every i, for a suﬃciently large K.





0 j 6= i
1 − βi
n j = i
First note that
Py(St = {i} | (n − 1)N + 1 ≤ t ≤ nN)













Px(St = {i} | |St| = 1,t = n)
Px(St = {i + 1} | |St| = 1,t = n)
Hence,
Px(St = {i} | |St| = 1) = Py(St = {i}). (7)
Since P(|St| ≥ 2) < ε, it follows that |pi
n(x)−pi
nN(y)| < ε, and therefore
k γ
i(x) − γ
i(y) k< (N + 1)ρε. (8)




i(n)) ≥ γi(y−i, ˜ yi














n(x) − (2N + 3)ρε,
as desired.
We deﬁne the partner ˜ i of a player i by : ˜ 1 = 2,˜ 2 = 1,˜ 3 = 4,˜ 4 = 3.
Lemma 7 Let a,b > 0 and let ε > 0 be suﬃciently small. Let y be a bε-
equilibrium such that ||yn − c|| < ε for each n. Let i ∈ N, and assume that




n1 ≤ (b + K)
√





14Proof. For convenience, assume i = 1. Since p1
∞ ≥ 2/15 − 5ε, Lemma 6
implies that there exists a stage n such that γ1(yn) < 1 +
√
ε. Let n1 be the
ﬁrst such stage. In particular, (i) holds. Observe that γ1(yn1−1) ≥ 1 +
√
ε,
hence by Lemma 6 bε ≥
√
εpi




ε + (2N + 3)ρ
√
ε.
Since the probability that player 1 quits in stage n1 − 1 is at most ε, (ii)
follows.
We now prove (iii). Since γ1(yn1) < 1 +
√
ε one has
































Corollary 8 Let b > 0 and a > 3(b + 1)
√
ε. There is no bε-equilibrium y
such that :
• ||yn − c|| < ε for each n
• γi(y),γ
˜ i(y)≥1 + a.
Proof. Let y be such a bε-equilibrium. Apply Lemma 7 twice, to players
i and ˜ i. Call n1 and n2 the corresponding two stages, and assume, w.l.o.g,
n1 ≤ n2. Thus, one has both p
˜ i















ε — a contradiction.
End of proof of Proposition 2: Assume to the contrary that x is an
ε-equilibrium with k xn − c k< ε for every n ∈ N. We assume w.l.o.g. that
γ1(x) ≥ 5/4−16ε. We will exhibit a stage n2 such that xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium,
and γ3(xn2),γ4(xn2) ≥ 1 + 1/12. By Corollary 8, we get a contradiction.












ε. By Lemma 6,
there exists a stage N2 < n1 with γ2(xN2) < 1 +
√
ε. We set
n2 = max{n ≤ n1,γ









11 and supi pi
∞ ≤ 1+5ε, one has Px(t < n2) ≤
13
15 + 10ε ≤ 7
8. Since x is an ε-equilibrium, xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium.




ε. If n2 = n1 there is nothing
to prove. Assume n2 < n1. This means that γ2(xn1) > 1+
√
ε. Apply Lemma
6 with y = xn2 (thus yn = xn2+n, for each n) and n = n1−n2. The conclusion,












We use this result to prove that γ3(xn2),γ4(xn2) ≥ 1 + 1/12.
As previously, one has




























On the other hand,

















n2 ≥ 1/12 − 10
√
ε, (10) yields γ3(xn2) ≥ 1 + 1
11 − 26
√
ε ≥ 1 +
1/12. Similarly, γ4(xn2) ≥ 1 + 1
12. Since xn2 is a 8ε-equilibrium, we get a
contradiction to Lemma 8.
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